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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and international 
capital flows to emerging market economies (EMEs). More specifically, it analyzes how 
ratings impact capital flows (FDI and portfolio investment) before and after the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. This study breaks the data into two samples, pre-crisis (1995-2006), 
and the post crisis (2007-2015). After using a System GMM method for 20 EMEs, the 
paper compares the pre- and post- financial crisis credit rating coefficients. The results 
indicate that the ratings have become more impactful overtime, for both FDI and 
portfolio investment, although the coefficients are not statistically different. Interestingly 
however, the coefficients for FDI grew much larger than portfolio investment, indicating 
bond investors may have become more reluctant to trust sovereign credit ratings after the 
financial crisis.   
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Introduction 
Sovereign credit ratings, which assess the riskiness of an investment in a 
particular country, are a key indicator in evaluating the risk attached to an asset. By rating 
different types of entities and financial instruments, credit ratings give investors a good 
idea of where their money is safe and where it is not. Typically, investors pay close 
attention to these ratings before making investment decisions. However, are sovereign 
credit ratings as important as previously thought? The practices of the agencies that 
assign credit ratings have been questioned, especially during the financial crisis. My 
paper looks for changes in the impact sovereign credit ratings have on capital flows to 
emerging market economies (EMEs) in the post great recession environment. Emerging 
market economies are generally defined as economies that are progressing, but are not yet 
as an advanced as the developed world. 1  
 In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in capital flowing to emerging 
markets. In the form of portfolio investment, capital flows have increased from around $6 
billion annually in 1988 to almost $34 billion by 1992 (Emara and El Said, 2015). More 
recent data from the Wealth of Nations dataset (Lane and Milessi-Ferretti, 2012) also 
shows large increases in capital flows from 1970 to 2011. For example in Brazil, one of 
the largest emerging market countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, which are 
                                                        
1The World Bank classifies economies based on their GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
They define low-income economies as economies with a GNI per capita under $1,025. Lower middle-income 
economies have a GNI per capita between $1,026 and $4,035. Upper-middle income economies are those with a GNI 
per capita between $4,036 and $12,745. These three groups of economies are used in this study and considered as 
“emerging market.”  
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private investments from non-residents, increased from $3.8 billion in 1970 up to $695 
billion by 2011. Over this same period the number of rated EMEs grew from 12 to 100 
(Emara and El Said, 2015). Therefore, one can argue that this drastic increase in capital 
flows is related to the recently published credit ratings. In general, investments in 
emerging markets offer a higher rate of return but also carry much more risk. To assess 
the particular level of risk, investors normally look at the ratings themselves before 
making any final decisions. Without any ratings, it would be very difficult for a country 
to attract capital. This could explain the fact that as the number of rated countries 
increased, so did the amount of capital flows.  
 Although credit ratings are essential for investors’ access to emerging markets, 
there has been some doubt cast upon ratings agencies in recent years. One criticism is that 
ratings are often sticky. In the mid 1990’s, credit rating agencies were unable to predict 
financial crises in Mexico and Asian by failing to downgrade their sovereign ratings. 
(Emara and El Said, 2015). A study by Mora (2006) showed that predicted ratings were 
lower than actual ratings in the period leading up to a crisis. Mora also noted that ratings 
do not contribute much information that is not already publically known to the market. 
Another important point to note is the high level of competition between ratings agencies. 
As agencies began charging fees to evaluate debt, the competition between them grew 
and so did the ratings. The so-called “ratings shopping” became a well-known practice 
and led to rating agencies handing out inflated evaluations to attract business. Also, 
through difference of opinion or differences in risk tolerance, ratings have become more 
variable and less transparent. Cantor and Packer (1994) state that Standard and Poor’s 
and Moody’s are often in disagreement when assessing junk bonds, or other high risk 
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securities. This discord between the top two credit rating agencies could cast doubt on the 
reliability of sovereign ratings. If there is in fact some distrust regarding credit ratings 
agencies, then it must be reflected in the data. The purpose of this paper is to empirically 
evaluate the importance of the sovereign ratings.  
 Considering the amount of uncertainty surrounding these ratings, this paper 
empirically tests if there has been a decrease in the impact that ratings have on capital 
flows in the pre- and post- financial crisis period. The results would tell whether investor 
reliance on sovereign credit ratings has changed over time. Available evidence suggests 
that ratings agencies have engaged in questionable practices, such as ratings shopping, 
and have made it hard to trust their products. This was especially evident during the 
recent recession. Because of investors’ increasing skepticism regarding these ratings, I 
hypothesize that over time there has been a decrease in the overall level of reliance on 
them. 
Literature Review 
 As previously mentioned, there exists extensive literature regarding the 
questionable nature of credit ratings. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2010) find evidence 
of conflicts of interest in the credit rating industry. Because of the current incentives to 
inflate ratings for more business they suggest the market would be more efficient as a 
monopoly instead. The oligopolistic market that currently exists for credit rating agencies 
provide more opportunities for the issuer to shop for inflated ratings and mislead trusting 
investors. As a result of the competitive nature of the industry, methodological 
 5 
differences between agencies, and sticky ratings, there are many investors who distrust 
the rating agencies. 
  However, the question of ratings reliability is far from settled. While Mora 
(2006) found that ratings do not include information that is not already known, Moon and 
Stotsky (1993) found that credit ratings include additional information on default risk that 
is not openly available in the markets. Artus, Garrigues, and Sassenou (1993) report that 
a direct relationship between bond yield and the credit ratings from the largest French 
credit rating agencies is either weak or nonexistent, meaning that ratings changes do not 
impact bond yields as much as previously thought. Normally, when a bond or any type of 
fixed income security, is downgraded, there is a resulting increase in the yield of the bond 
since the investment has become riskier. However, Reinhart (2002) finds that ratings do 
well at predicting defaults but also goes on to note that “ratings would not have 
anticipated the nearly certain defaults that would have taken place in several recent crises 
absent large-scale bail-outs by the international community.” The present study 
contributes to this debate by studying the sovereign rating’s impact on capital flow 
investment in EMEs. 
 There have also been more general studies on the relationship between sovereign 
credit ratings and capital flows. These studies are important to consider before attempting 
to answer my main question because they provide useful background information. 
Reinhart (2002), the study on the role of sovereign ratings during financial crises, 
concludes that the probability and magnitude of a credit downgrade are significantly 
higher for EMEs compared to the developed world. Since my tests are limited to 
emerging markets, I too expect to see large changes in the credit ratings over time. Cantor 
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and Packer (1994) find that the impact of announcements by credit ratings agencies have 
a stronger impact on spreads for noninvestment grade bonds, similar to emerging market 
debt, than for investment grades, which is the debt of high credit rated issuers. If bond 
yields are sensitive to ratings changes in the noninvestment grade markets, then one could 
argue that the emerging market capital flows will also be highly responsive to ratings 
changes. This is shown in a study conducted by Körner and Trautwein (2014) who find 
that higher ratings lead to higher portfolio investment inflows for non-investment grades, 
while finding a weaker effect for investment grade, meaning investors are more reactive 
when dealing with lower rated debt. The literature points to the responsiveness of 
emerging market capital flows to their corresponding credit ratings. With this in mind, I 
predict that the volatility of this market should lead to high ratings coefficients initially.  
 Previous papers that attempt to find the determinants of capital flows are too 
numerous to be referenced here, I will focus only on the few most relevant to my sample. 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) find that institutional quality, which 
measures the social and political stability of a country, is the leading determinant of 
capital flows. Emara and El Said (2015) disaggregate capital flows into FDI and portfolio 
investment while controlling for several independent variables including sovereign credit 
ratings. They find that the sovereign ratings have a statistically significant impact on both 
FDI and portfolio investment capital flows.  
 In a similar paper , Byrne and Fiess (2016) also attempts to find the determinants 
of capital flows to emerging markets. The results show that the most important factor in 
determining capital flows is the real US interest rate, in contrast to Emara and El-Said 
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(2015), who find no statistical significance in global interest rates’ effect on portfolio 
investment in emerging markets.  
 Other factors that were significant determinants in these papers were financial 
openness, current account balances, and GDP growth, which are all included in this 
paper.  
Empirical Model and Data Description 
The following models will form the benchmark of the empirical analysis 
below:
 
ℎ𝑓𝑔
 
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛽2(𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛽5(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) +
𝛽8(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡)
= 𝛽0(𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽3(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽4(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽5(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽7(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽8(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽9(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 
This study focuses on the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and capital 
flows, captured by the coefficient 1. Capital flows generally refer to the movement of 
money in the form of capital transactions, such as stocks and bonds. There exist many 
different types of capital flows; for the purposes of this paper, I focus only on FDI (direct 
equity investment in which the investor attains ownership or controlling power in a 
foreign entity) and portfolio bond investment (the total amount of a countries’ portfolio 
bond flows). My choice for these two types of capital flows is based on the previous 
literature in which Emara and El Said (2015) disaggregate capital flows into FDI and 
portfolio investment. It will be particularly interesting to compare the impact of sovereign 
credit ratings on each type of capital flows.  
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 As often done in the literature, explanatory variables can be broken up into two 
categories. The first called “pull factors,” includes country specific factors that attract 
capital into a country: sovereign ratings, inflation rate, GDP growth per capita, GDP, real 
interest rate, and an index of financial openness and institutional quality. GDP growth per 
capita captures the future potential of an economy while nominal GDP is used to control 
for country size (since larger countries should generally attract more capital). Financial 
openness captures the severity of a country’s capital controls and the extent of its capital 
transaction history (Byrne and Fiess, 2016). As mentioned in the studies by Lucas and 
Alfaro (1990), and Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), institutional quality plays a 
significant role in capital flow determinations and thus should be included in this study. 
Institutional quality is a variable that will take into account the quality of a country’s 
political structure and is essentially a measure of how democratic a state is. Higher 
democratic ratings encourage free markets and foreign investment, so this variable should 
exhibit a positive relation with capital flows.  
 The variable of interest, sovereign credit ratings, is taken from Standard and 
Poor’s ratings agency; its values range from 1 (default rating) to 21 (AAA rating). 
 The other group of variables that are included in this model are called “push 
factors”. These are global forces that “push” capital out of developed into developing  
countries and thus are not country specific. Representing this group of variables in my 
model is the real US interest rate and US GDP. The reason that these variables are 
important to consider is that in many cases, capital flows could be attributed to factors 
outside of the country into which they are flowing. For example, the coefficient 2 on the 
US real interest rate should be negative for both forms of capital flows because as the 
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interest rate falls in the developed markets, investors look for higher returns elsewhere 
and begin to invest in emerging markets.  
 All the explanatory variables in the model are lagged by one period, which in this 
study is equal to one year, to eliminate any reverse causality from capital flows to other 
country-specific macro indicators. By lagging the independent variables, the model 
should avoid this problem and be able to produce more accurate results.  
 The study focuses on the following 20 emerging market countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South Africa, 
Thailand, and the Ukraine.  
The time span considered is 1995-2015. By using the most current data available, 
I am able to study the effects after the recent financial crisis in greater detail. I carefully 
selected each sample country by considering both their status as an emerging market 
country, and their data availability. Most of the data I acquire comes directly from the 
World Bank Indicators database. Financial openness index is obtained from the Chinn 
and Ito database (Chinn and Ito, 2006). The measurement of state stability is taken from 
an index prepared by the Political Instability Task Force. The dataset is called Polity IV 
levels and measures the political systems in place for each country. And the credit ratings 
are attained from Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings history.  
Empirical Methodology 
 
 Before proceeding with estimation, I first study the matrix of correlations between 
all variables in the model to detect possible instances of multicollinearity. High 
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correlation can be problematic because it has the potential to skew regression results:  
highly correlated independent variable could absorb some of the statistical significance 
from other variables of interest. I found the only two variables with a sizeable correlation 
(of above 0.8 or below -.08) were US interest rate and US GDP. Therefore I chose to 
drop U.S. GDP from the model and use the U.S. interest rate as the only external push 
factor.  
 In order to find whether the reliance on sovereign ratings has changed over time, I 
run the regression over different time intervals. By considering the whole dataset, I will 
be able to determine the main drivers of the different types of capital flows. Then I split 
the datasets in half into the pre-crisis period of 1995-2006 and the post-crisis period of 
2007-2015. The reliability of the rating agencies was heavily questioned because of their 
role in the crisis and therefore I expect the pre- and post- crisis results to differ. More 
specifically, I am interested in how the credit ratings coefficient, 1,  changed from pre-
crisis to post-crisis, and whether this change is statistically significant.  
 Since this study aims to find how the ratings have changed over time, it uses time 
series data to measure the changes over a certain interval instead of measuring the effects 
at one particular point in time. Therefore this paper implements a System GMM 
(“General Method of Moments”) approach instead of OLS, to correct for several potential 
shortfalls. The model suffers from serial correlation and endogeneity. Specifically in this 
case, the dependent capital flows variables would be highly serially correlated. 
Intuitively, it stands to reason that capital flows into a country at time t depend partly on 
the capital flows from t-1. System GMM will correct for these issues by using lags.
Results 
Table 1: FDI and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent Variable: FDI (in millions of current $USD) 
Estimation Method: System GMM 
 
 
               Full Sample           Pre-Crisis   Post-Crisis 
            1              2                3                           1                 2                 3                              1                 2                  3 
 
FDIit-1           .567        .569              .594         .539            .539          .535                  .283            .393          .417 
     (0.00)***    (0.00)***     (0.00)***         (0.00)***   (0.00)***   (0.00)***     (.009)***   (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
 
Credit       1,319         1,342         1,217       79.07         75.67        8.35                  3371.85      4496.64       4282.23 
Ratingsit-1 (0.00)***    (0.00)***   (0.00)***       (.683)         (.694)       (.963)                (.024)**     (.003)***    (.005)*** 
 
Inflationit-1   -35.87        -44.5         -3.99       56.24        56.86         63.54                  -89.72       -377.87        -445.45 
                     (.67)           (.6)            (.96)              (.081)*     (.076)*      (.044)*            (.878)        (.534)           (.460) 
 
GDP             287.93        289.82       341.56         168.39       170.74       170          651.96       423.3           438.54 
Growthit-1     (.111)         (.108)         (.057)*        (.067)*      (.063)*     (.064)*              (.206)        (.429)           (.413) 
 
GDPit-1        1.14e-08      1.14e-08    1.13e-08       2.58e-08    2.58e-08   2.68e-08           9.82e-09     1.25e-08       1.24e-08 
      (0.00)***    (0.00)***   (0.00)***     (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***         (.004)***    (0.00)***     (0.00)*** 
 
Interest       79.11            64.56        124.5            6.2             6.31            15.57              1857.2         1575.6         1621.75 
Rateit-1       (.344)            (.435)        (.115)           (.873)         (.87)           (.679)             (0.00)***    (0.00)***    (0.00)*** 
 
Current      1.12e-07      1.68e-07     1.17e-07       1.47e-07    1.46e-07  1.44e-07        -3.47e-08    8.92e-08     1.01e-07      
Accountit-1  (0.00)***    (0.00)***    (0.00)***     (0.00)***   (0.00)***    (0.00)***      (.465)          (.027)**     (.009)** 
 
US Interest   -740.1      -649.9          -698.37          124.95        128.88       171.96           -1356.6       -555.3        -778.3          
 Ratet-1          (.055)*      (.087)*        (.067)*          (.554)          (.535)        (.679)            (.372)          (.725)        (.619) 
 
Financial     -2650.99     -2702.56                         -757.85        -752.07                            -1589.56      -4149.77 
Opennessit-1    (0.23)**     (.02)**                           (.243)            (.245)             (.706)           (.34) 
 
State              159.3           3.79                                                     -5879.83 
Stabilityit-1      (.158)                                                (.09)*                                                   (0.00)*** 
Observations   335         335           335               175              175              175                 142              142               142 
 
 
Notes: a.) Pvalues, ***<.01, **<.05, *<.1 (reported in parentheses)  
            b.)Regression 1-includes all explanatory variables 
   Regression 2-drops state stability for robustness check 
   Regression 3-drops state stability and financial openness for robustness check 
            c.) Pre-crisis refers to 1995-2006 
    Post-crisis refers to 2007-2015 
 
   
Regression results are broken up by type of capital flow, and then further by the 
time period. The full sample regressions illustrate what drives capital flows into the 
developing world. The pre and post-crisis results show how each coefficient changes over 
time. The first capital flow variable, FDI, offers some interesting results, presented in 
Table 1.  
 In terms of pull variables that attract FDI to the developing nations, GDP growth, 
GDP, current account balance, state stability and financial openness are all found to be 
statistically significant over different intervals. The financial openness index has an 
unexpected negative sign while both GDP variables and current account balance have a 
positive relationship with FDI. State stability, contrary to the results in Byrne and Fiess 
(2016), is statistically insignificant for the full panel and is dropped after the first 
regression as a robustness check. Inflation and country-specific interest rates are also 
insignificant in the full sample results but are significant in the smaller pre-and post- 
crisis samples. Inflation is inversely related to FDI while interest rates are positively 
related. A somewhat surprise result is the pre and post crisis insignificance of the U.S. 
interest rates, which nonetheless has an expected negative sign indicating that decreases 
in U.S. rates pushes capital to the emerging markets. It is possible that both interest rates 
are insignificant because the dependent variable is foreign direct investment, which 
captures long-term mergers and acquisitions, decisions rather than shorter-term purchases 
of interest bearing bonds.  
 This study’s main variable of interest, credit ratings, is significant at the 1% level 
and has a positive relationship with FDI capital inflows.  The estimated value of the 
coefficient implies that a one point credit rating upgrade increases FDI by 1.3 billion 
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dollars. Since the main question of this paper is to see how the importance of credit 
ratings has changed over time, we are ultimately interested in the pre- and post- crisis 
results. In the pre-crisis sample, the coefficient 1 is positive but insignificant, indicating 
a 79 million dollar increase in FDI for each 1-point increase in rating. When using post-
crisis data, the sovereign ratings coefficient regains its statistical significance. Here, a 1-
point ratings upgrade produces a 3.37 billion dollar increase in FDI, which is a huge jump 
from the pre-crisis level of 79 million. In this case, credit ratings have actually gained 
importance and lead to bigger changes in FDI. It appears that the initial hypothesis-that 
ratings have become less important after the crisis-is incorrect. This could be partially 
attributed to the large number of financial crises in the 1990s, which Reinhart (2002) and 
Cantor and Packer (1994) suggest doubt on the rating agencies practices and point to their 
inconsistencies. Thus, the concerns surrounding credit ratings may have hit financial 
markets beginning in the mid-1990’s, rather than during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
which could explain the increasing coefficients post-crisis. Another possible explanation 
for the change in the coefficient value is the nature of the dependent variable. It is 
possible that since FDI captures private equity investment, credit worthiness is not as 
much of a driving factor. FDI investors might be more concerned with growth potential 
and external market trends instead. This could also explain the insignificance of the 
coefficient on variables like country-specific interest rate and the U.S. interest rate.   
 Although the pre- and post- crisis coefficients are visually different, it is 
important to test if they are statistically different. Using the statistical method for 
comparing regression coefficients developed by Clogg, Petkova and Haritou (1995), I ran 
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a quick z-test to compare the two credit rating coefficients. The results indicate a z-score 
of 1.95, which means credit ratings are not statistically different for FDI.  
 
Table 1: Portfolio Bond Investment and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent Variable: Portfolio Investment (in millions of current $USD) 
Estimation Method: System GMM 
 
 
   Full Sample        Pre-Crisis    Post-Crisis 
        1              2               3                           1               2               3                          1                   2                3 
Portfolio    .653          .654          .655         -.162          -.153          -.176                .635             .636           .640 
Bondsit-1    (0.00)***   (0.00)*** (0.00)***           (.054)*       (.066)*        (.028)**            (0.00)***    (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
 
Credit    378.82        376.45      411.77                 495.64        401.72    341.96  1081.61       1077.21     1181.5 
Ratingit-1   (.064)*      (.064)*     (.039)***              (.005)***   (.011)**    (.024)** (.055)*        (.055)**    (.031)*** 
 
Inflationit    -92.94       -94.46       -98.07          106.43        79.47          76.13   -213.6          -205.86       -254.68 
      (.215)       (.201)        (.184)          (.038)**      (.087)*       (.091)* (.511)           (.508)          (.407) 
 
GDP     -90.29       -91.35       -84.88          244.11 233.1     208.99 -137.31       -136.6         -171.05 
Growthit-1    (.368)        (.360)        (.394)                (.001)***    (.001)***   (.003)***  (.589)          (.585)          (.489) 
 
GDPit-1     6.90e-10    6.79e-10   6.40e-10          -2.29e-10    -5.19e-10   -1.19e-09  -6.3e-10     -7.19e-10     -9.24e-10 
     (.151)       (.151)         (.175)           (.913) (.803)       (.552)                (.693)         (.464)          (.335) 
 
Interest      -10.19      -10.36         -6.9          -2.29e-10     -5.19e-10     -1.19e-09         82.67           87.58          86.93   
Rateit-1       (.839)       (.838)        (.890)           (.067)*          (.052)*        (.072)*            (.671)          (.649)         (.650) 
 
Current       4.78e-09   4.70e-09     4.50e-09            -8.19e-08     -8.34e-08     -7.67e-08        6.41e-08      6.26e-08    6.14e-08 
Accountit-1    (.663)       (.667)          (.680)             (.002)***     (.001)***     (.002)***       (.066)*        (.020)***    (.022)** 
 
US Interest   -455.49    -463.66      -440.24               -13.03          -66.46         -82.11     -2409.73      -2421.84    -2300.58 
Rateit-1            (.032)**  (.022)**    (.028)**              (.936)          (.667)         (.584)      (.001)***   (.001)***  (.001)*** 
 
Financial       509.24     512.11                    -1175.88      -1087.9          1972.87      1961.18 
Openessit-1     (.421)      (.417)                 (.016)**       (.022)**                             (.298)          (.297) 
 
State          28.08    284.21          -71.65 
Stabilityit-1     (.899)    (.195)           (.947) 
Observations   278       278             278                         158             158             158                    105             105             105     
 
 
Notes: a.) Pvalues, ***<.01, **<.05, *<.1 (reported in parentheses)  
            b.)Regression 1-includes all explanatory variables 
   Regression 2-drops state stability for robustness check 
   Regression 3-drops state stability and financial openness for robustness check 
            c.) Pre-crisis refers to 1995-2006 
    Post-crisis refers to 2007-2015
When estimating this same model with portfolio bond inflows, rather than FDI, 
the results are quite different (see Table 2). 
 Different factors in the model are significant in some time frames and not in 
others. For example, inflation is only significant in the pre-crisis model and surprisingly 
has a positive coefficient. This result could be attributed to the large increases of capital 
flows to emerging markets during this time period, accompanied by significant price 
level increases (Bonizzi, 2013). Since inflation and capital inflows were both increasing 
at this time, it makes sense that the model predicted a positive relationship. Nominal 
GDP, which is used to control for country size, is surprisingly insignificant in each 
regression, in contrast to the results reported in Table 1. This difference could be 
attributed to the different drivers of capital flows, insofar as GDP levels could have a 
larger importance for private equity investors than bond portfolios. Bond investors’ main 
concerns tend to be return and risk, while FDI is most likely driven by long-term business 
prospects. This same argument applies to GDP growth, which is positive and significant 
pre-crisis but not post-crisis or in the full sample.  
 The coefficients on country-specific interest rates exhibit interesting patterns in 
this model. In the full sample regressions, they are negative and statistically insignificant. 
While the rates are significant pre-crisis, the more recent post-crisis results also are 
insignificant with expected positive coefficients. After the global recession, many 
investors started looking for stable securities causing capital flight out of the emerging 
countries into the developed world. This capital flight could explain the inconsistent 
results as interest rates no longer were a significant factor that attracted capital while 
investors flocked to safe havens.  
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 Current account balance is insignificant in the full sample but significant for the 
pre and post crisis series. In the pre-crisis years there is a negative relationship with 
portfolio bond investment and a positive relationship in the post-crisis years. In the pre-
crisis sample, the model estimates that as a country increases its current account deficit, 
portfolio bond investment goes up in the following time period. A negative relationship 
between these two variables makes sense because in order to finance current account 
deficits, the government may need to borrow by issuing more bonds. 
 The estimated coefficients on the two institutional indexes, state stability and 
financial openness, are similar to the FDI regression results. Financial openness is 
significant in the pre-crisis sample, but again has a surprising negative sign. State 
stability is insignificant and is subsequently omitted in regressions 2 and 3 for each 
period considered in the paper. 
 The U.S. interest rate is significant in the full and the post-crisis samples. The 
coefficients are negative, indicating that lower rates of return in the developed world push 
capital to the emerging markets.  
 Last but not least, credit ratings are significant throughout each regression and 
each time series, indicating they are more important for portfolio bond investment than 
FDI. All coefficients are positive, similar to the FDI regressions results. Again, it looks 
like the importance of sovereign ratings has increased overtime. The pre-crisis coefficient 
states that a ratings upgrade from a year ago will lead to an increase in portfolio bond 
inflows by $496 million. After the global crisis, the results show as a country’s rating 
improves, its bond inflows will increase by about $1.1 billion. So for portfolio bond 
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flows, like FDI, we can conclude that sovereign ratings have become more important 
which contradicts the initial hypothesis of this paper.  
 Again, for the purpose of this paper, testing the difference between the two credit 
rating coefficients is imperative. The results state that the statistical difference between 
the coefficients is 0.79, which means there was no statistically significant change after 
the financial crisis.   
 An interesting point to note however, is that the ratings coefficient grew much 
faster for FDI than portfolio bond investment. In Emara and El-Said’s (2015) study, the 
results also indicate a higher coefficient for FDI than portfolio investment. Clearly, the 
higher coefficient for FDI means that the ratings have a larger impact for this type of 
capital flow. Although, as previously mentioned, FDI does not include debt instruments 
and does not contain the same risks of default like portfolio bond investments do. And 
since the ratings measure the risk of default, the ratings intuitively should have a larger 
impact on portfolio bond investment than FDI, which they did in the pre-crisis dataset but 
not after the crisis. If bad credit rating reputation did in fact affect the markets, it would 
make sense that the coefficients for the capital flow that is more dependent on ratings, in 
this case portfolio bond investment, are smaller. In other words, investors in the FDI 
business might have not cared about the credit rating information that became public 
starting in the 1990s as much as portfolio bond investors did. So although investor 
reliance on the ratings for both types of capital flows has grown over time, there is some 
showings of credit rating distrust reflected in the growth rates of the coefficients.   
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 A final possible scenario is the overall effect of the financial crisis. The data 
should certainly have been impacted and a break at the time of the financial crisis was 
expected to produce very different coefficients. These results however, could be a 
product of other issues caused by the recession and not solely because of credit rating 
reputation. The crisis would have interrupted investor behavior from the decade leading 
up to it, so new investment patterns such as flight to safe havens and home biases could 
play a factor in post-crisis results.  
 A common post regression test when using system GMM is the Sargan test. The 
purpose of the Sargan test is to test the validity of the set of instruments used in the 
model. Rejecting the null hypothesis would essentially confirm the choices of the 
variables as a good set of instruments. After running these tests, the p-values were very 
low so the null could not actually be rejected. A possible explanation for these results is 
issues of heteroskedacity in the data.  
Conclusion 
 The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the change in the effect of sovereign 
credit ratings on capital flows to EMEs. This study attempts to find the change by 
evaluating the coefficients attached to sovereign credit ratings when using system GMM 
regressions run over different time intervals. The first interval incorporates the years 
leading up to the financial crisis and the second interval includes the years of the crisis 
and the years directly after. This paper also splits capital flows into two specific 
subgroups, FDI and portfolio bond investment. The results show that for each type of 
capital flow, the coefficients of the credit ratings increase over time. This means that the 
 20 
ratings have actually become more impactful in the post-crisis years (though both 
differences in coefficients were not statistically different). This gain in importance 
contradicts the initial hypothesis of this paper, that credit ratings would become less 
important over time due to bad reputations during the financial crisis. The results indicate 
that while both capital flow variables have become more dependent on ratings, their 
impact on FDI has outpaced the impact on portfolio bond investments.  
Appendix: Data Sources and Description 
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows- Foreign direct investment refers to direct 
investment equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, and other capital. Direct investment is a category of cross-
border investment associated with a resident in one economy having control or a 
significant degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in 
another economy. Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock 
is the criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship. Data are 
in current U.S. dollars. Taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Series 
Code: BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD 
Portfolio Bond Investment- Bonds are securities issued with a fixed rate of interest for a 
period of more than one year. They include net flows through cross-border public and 
publicly guaranteed and private nonguaranteed bond issues. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars.Taken from World Bank Development Indicators. Series Code: 
DT.NFL.BOND.CD 
Inflation- Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. Taken from World Bank Development Indicators. 
Series Code: FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
GDP per capita growth- Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per 
capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's 
prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Taken from World Bank Development 
Indicators. Series Code: NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG 
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GDP- GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year 
official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not 
reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative 
conversion factor is used. Taken from World Bank Development Indicators. Series Code: 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
Current Account Balance- Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods and 
services, net primary income, and net secondary income. Taken from World Bank 
Development Indicators. Series Code: BN.CAB.XOKA.CD 
Real Interest Rate- Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions attached to lending rates differ 
by country, however, limiting their comparability. Taken from World Bank Development 
Indicators. Series Code: FR.INR.RINR 
Polity Levels/State Stability- Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2015, annual, cross-national, time-series and polity-case formats 
coding democratic and autocratic "patterns of authority" and regime changes in all 
independent countries with total population greater than 500,000 in 2015 (167 countries 
in 2015) (SPSS and Excel data; PDF codebook) Taken from the Center of Systemic 
Peace.  
Financial Openness- The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's 
degree of capital account openness. The index was initially introduced in Chinn and Ito 
(Journal of Development Economics, 2006). KAOPEN is based on the binary dummy 
variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions 
reported in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). 
Standard and Poor’s Sovereign Credit Ratings- the opinion of an entity's ability and 
willingness to meet all of its financial obligations on a timely basis, regardless of 
the currency in which those obligations are denominated and absent transfer and 
convertibility restrictions. Taken from S&P’s historical sovereign local currency ratings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Works Cited 
Alfaro, Laura & Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem & Volosovych, Vadym, 2008. " Why Doesn’t 
Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation,"The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 347-368, 01. 
Artus, P., Garrigues, J., and  Sassenou M, 1993. “Interest rate costs and issue ratings: the 
case of French CP and Bonds.” Journal of International Securities Markets, vol. 7, pp. 
211-218. 
Bolton, Patrick, Freixas, Xavier and Shapiro, Joel, 2011. "The Credit Ratings Game." 
Journal of Finance 67, 85-112 
Bonizzi, Bruno, 2013. “Capital market inflation in emerging markets: The case of Brazil 
and South Korea”. PSL Quarterly Review, Vol. 68, No. 273, pp. 115-150, 2015  
Byrne, Joseph P. and Fiess, Norbert, 2016. “International Capital Flows to Emerging 
Markets: National and Global Determinants,” Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), 82-100 
Cantor, Richard and Packer, Frank, 1994. “The Credit Rating Industry.” Quarterly 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue sum, pages 1-26.  
Clogg, Clifford C, Petkova, Eva, and Haritou, Adamantios. 1995. “Statistical methods for 
comparing regression coefficients between models.” American Journal of Sociology, Vol 
100(5), Mar 1995, 1261-129 
Chinn, Menzie D. and Ito, Hiro, 2006. “What matters for Financial Development? Capital 
Controls, Institutions, and Interactions,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol 81 (1) 
Pages 163-192, October.  
Emara, Noha M.F & El Said, Ayah, 2015.“Revisiting Sovereign Ratings, Capital Flows 
and Financial Contagion in Emerging Markets,” World Journal of Applied Economics, 
1(2): 3-22. 15 Feb 2016 
Körner, Finn Marten and Trautwein, Hans-Michael, 2014. “Sovereign Credit Ratings and 
the Transnationalization of Finance – Evidence from a Gravity Model of Portfolio 
Investment. Economics Discussion Papers”, No 2014-31, Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy. 16 July 2014 
Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian M, 2012. "The External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004", 
Journal of International Economics 73, 223-250, November. 
Lucas, Robert E. Jr, 1990. “Why doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?,” 
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80 (2) pages 92-96, 
May  
 23 
Moon, C.-G. and Stotsky, J. G, 1993. “Testing the differences between the determinants 
of moody's and standard & poor's ratings an application of smooth simulated maximum 
likelihood estimation.” Journal of Applied Econometrics,vol. 8(1) 51–69. Pages 51-69 
Mora, Nada, 2006. “Sovereign Credit Ratings: Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt?,” 
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30 (7), pages 2041-2062, July.  
Reinhart, Carmen M, 2002. “Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings,” 
World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(2), pages 151-170 
 
 
 
